

Arrovian Aggregation Models

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[A Primer in Social Choice Theory](#) - Wulf Gaertner 2006

This introductory text explores the theory of social choice. Written as a primer suitable for advanced undergraduates and graduates, this text will act as an important starting point for students grappling with the complexities of social choice theory. Rigorous yet accessible, this primer avoids the use of technical language and provides an up-to-date discussion of this rapidly developing field. This is the first in a series of texts published in association with the LSE.

Doklady - 2008

[Soft Computing Applications for Group Decision-making and Consensus Modeling](#) - Mikael Collan 2017-06-30

This book offers a concise introduction and comprehensive overview of the state of the art in the field of decision-making and consensus modeling, with a special emphasis on fuzzy methods. It consists of a collection of authoritative contributions reporting on the decision-making process from different perspectives: from psychology to social and political sciences, from decision sciences to data mining, and from computational sciences in general, to artificial and computational intelligence and systems. Written as a homage to Mario Fedrizzi for his scholarly achievements, creative ideas and long lasting services to different scientific communities, it introduces key theoretical concepts, describes new models and methods, and discusses a range of promising real-world applications in the field of decision-making science. It is a timely reference guide and a source of inspiration for advanced students and researchers

The Political Economy of Democracy and Tyranny - Norman Schofield 2009

One theme that has emerged from the recent literature on political economy concerns the transition to democracy: why would dominant elites give up oligarchic power? This book addresses the fundamental question of democratic stability and the collapse of tyranny by considering a formal model of democracy and tyranny. The formal model is used to study elections in developed polities such as the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Canada, and Israel, as well as complex developing polities such as Turkey. The key idea is that activist groups may offer resources to political candidates if they in turn adjust their polities in favor of the interest group. In polities that use a "first past the post" electoral system, such as the US, the bargaining between interest groups and candidates creates a tendency for activist groups to coalesce; in polities such as Israel and the Netherlands, where the electoral system is very proportional, there may be little tendency for activist coalescence. A further feature of the model is that candidates, or political leaders, like Barack Obama, with high intrinsic charisma, or valence, will be attracted to the electoral center, while less charismatic leaders will move to the electoral periphery. This aspect of the model is used to compare the position taking and exercise of power of authoritarian leaders in Portugal, Argentina and the Soviet Union. The final chapter of the book suggests that the chaos that may be induced by climate change and rapid population growth can only be addressed by concerted action directed by a charismatic leader of the Atlantic democracies.

The State of Economics, the State of the World - Kaushik Basu 2020-01-07

Leading economists address the ongoing challenges to economics in theory and practice in a time of political and economic crises. More than a decade of financial crises, sovereign debt problems, political conflict, and rising xenophobia and protectionism has left the global economy unsettled and the ability of economics as a discipline to account for episodes of volatility uncertain. In this book, leading economists consider the state of their discipline in a world of ongoing economic and political crises. The book begins with three sweeping essays by Nobel laureates Kenneth Arrow (in one of his last published works), Amartya Sen, and

Joseph Stiglitz that offer a summary of the theoretical foundations of modern economics—the twin pillars of general equilibrium theory and welfare economics. Contributors then turn to macroeconomic stabilization and growth and, finally, new areas of research that depart from traditional theory, methodology, and concerns: climate change, behavioral economics, and evolutionary game theory. The 2019 Nobel Prize laureates, Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Michael Kremer, contribute a paper on the use of randomized control trials in development economics. Contributors Philippe Aghion, Ingela Alger, Kenneth Arrow, Abhijit Banerjee, Kaushik Basu, Lawrence Blume, Guillermo Calvo, Francesco Caselli, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, Shantayanan Devarajan, Esther Duflo, Samuel Fankhauser, James Foster, Varun Gauri, Xavier Gine, G ael Giraud, Gita Gopinath, Robert Hockett, Karla Hoff, Ravi Kanbur, Aart Kraay, Michael Kremer, David McKenzie, C elestin Monga, Maurice Obstfeld, Hamid Rashid, Martin Ravallion, Amartya Sen, Luis Serv en, Hyun Song Shin, Nicholas Stern, Joseph Stiglitz, Cass Sunstein, Michael Toman, J orgen Weibull

Handbook of Computational Social Choice - Felix Brandt 2016-04-25

The rapidly growing field of computational social choice, at the intersection of computer science and economics, deals with the computational aspects of collective decision making. This handbook, written by thirty-six prominent members of the computational social choice community, covers the field comprehensively. Chapters devoted to each of the field's major themes offer detailed introductions. Topics include voting theory (such as the computational complexity of winner determination and manipulation in elections), fair allocation (such as algorithms for dividing divisible and indivisible goods), coalition formation (such as matching and hedonic games), and many more. Graduate students, researchers, and professionals in computer science, economics, mathematics, political science, and philosophy will benefit from this accessible and self-contained book.

[Revealed Preference Theory](#) - Christopher P. Chambers 2016-01-05

The theory of revealed preference has a long, distinguished tradition in economics but lacked a systematic presentation of the theory until now. This book deals with basic questions in economic theory and studies situations in which empirical observations are consistent or inconsistent with some of the best known economic theories.

Bioconsensus - Melvin F. Janowitz

This volume is based on two DIMACS working group meetings on "Bioconsensus". It provides a valuable introduction and reference to the various aspects of this rapidly developing field. The meetings brought together mathematical and biological scientists to discuss the uses in the biological sciences of methods of consensus and social choice. These two lively meetings contributed much toward establishing the new field of "bioconsensus". Yet this book is much more than just a report of two meetings. It includes some historical background, as well as a substantial introduction to the axiomatic foundations of the field of bioconsensus and some practical applications of consensus methods to real data. Also included are contributed papers from experts who were not at the meetings. The book is intended for mathematical biologists, evolutionary biologists, and computer scientists.

[A Course in Mathematical and Statistical Ecology](#) - Anil Gore 2013-04-17

A Course in Mathematical and Statistical Ecology

Arrovian Aggregation Models - Fuad T. Aleskerov 2013-06-29

Aggregation of individual opinions into a social decision is a problem widely observed in everyday life. For centuries people tried to invent the 'best' aggregation rule. In 1951 young American scientist and future Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow formulated the problem in an axiomatic way, i.e., he specified a set of axioms which every reasonable aggregation rule has to satisfy, and obtained that these axioms are inconsistent. This result, often called Arrow's Paradox or General Impossibility Theorem, had become a cornerstone of social choice theory. The main condition used by Arrow was his famous Independence of

Irrelevant Alternatives. This very condition pre-defines the 'local' treatment of the alternatives (or pairs of alternatives, or sets of alternatives, etc.) in aggregation procedures. Remaining within the framework of the axiomatic approach and based on the consideration of local rules, Arrovian Aggregation Models investigates three formulations of the aggregation problem according to the form in which the individual opinions about the alternatives are defined, as well as to the form of desired social decision. In other words, we study three aggregation models. What is common between them is that in all models some analogue of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives condition is used, which is why we call these models Arrovian aggregation models. Chapter 1 presents a general description of the problem of axiomatic synthesis of local rules, and introduces problem formulations for various versions of formalization of individual opinions and collective decision. Chapter 2 formalizes precisely the notion of 'rationality' of individual opinions and social decision. Chapter 3 deals with the aggregation model for the case of individual opinions and social decisions formalized as binary relations. Chapter 4 deals with Functional Aggregation Rules which transform into a social choice function individual opinions defined as choice functions. Chapter 5 considers another model - Social Choice Correspondences when the individual opinions are formalized as binary relations, and the collective decision is looked for as a choice function. Several new classes of rules are introduced and analyzed.

Judgment Aggregation - Davide Grossi 2014-03-01

Judgment aggregation is a mathematical theory of collective decision-making. It concerns the methods whereby individual opinions about logically interconnected issues of interest can, or cannot, be aggregated into one collective stance. Aggregation problems have traditionally been of interest for disciplines like economics and the political sciences, as well as philosophy, where judgment aggregation itself originates from, but have recently captured the attention of disciplines like computer science, artificial intelligence and multi-agent systems. Judgment aggregation has emerged in the last decade as a unifying paradigm for the formalization and understanding of aggregation problems. Still, no comprehensive presentation of the theory is available to date. This Synthesis Lecture aims at filling this gap presenting the key motivations, results, abstractions and techniques underpinning it.

Finance India - 2005

American Book Publishing Record Cumulative 2000 - R R Bowker Publishing 2001-03

Welfare: Measuring social welfare - Dale Waeldeau Jorgenson 1997

This volume presents an approach to the evaluation of economic policies through the econometric modeling of aggregate consumer behavior. While the preferences of individual consumers are revealed by their market choices, these preferences can be recovered only by econometric methods, not through the index numbers used in the official statistics. The richer and more robust methodology presented in this volume provides a fruitful point of departure for future policy evaluations. The econometric approach replaces ordinal measures of individual welfare that cannot be compared among individuals with cardinal measures that can. These are combined into an indicator of social welfare that reflects principles of horizontal and vertical equity. This approach unifies the measurement of poverty, inequality, and cost and standard of living. It extends the scope of normative economics to a broader range of issues in the evaluation of economic and social policies.

New Trends in Fuzzy Set Theory and Related Items - Esteban Indurain 2018-09-04

This book is a printed edition of the Special Issue "New Trends in Fuzzy Set Theory and Related Items" that was published in *Axioms*

Arrovian Aggregation Models - Fuad T. Aleskerov 1999-03-31

Aggregation of individual opinions into a social decision is a problem widely observed in everyday life. For centuries people tried to invent the 'best' aggregation rule. In 1951 young American scientist and future Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow formulated the problem in an axiomatic way, i.e., he specified a set of axioms which every reasonable aggregation rule has to satisfy, and obtained that these axioms are inconsistent. This result, often called Arrow's Paradox or General Impossibility Theorem, had become a cornerstone of social choice theory. The main condition used by Arrow was his famous Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives. This very condition pre-defines the 'local' treatment of the alternatives (or pairs of alternatives, or sets of alternatives, etc.) in aggregation procedures. Remaining within the framework of the axiomatic approach and based on the consideration of

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Case-Based Approximate Reasoning - Eyke Hüllermeier 2007-03-20

Making use of different frameworks of approximate reasoning and reasoning under uncertainty, notably probabilistic and fuzzy set-based techniques, this book develops formal models of the above inference principle, which is fundamental to CBR. The case-based approximate reasoning methods thus obtained especially emphasize the heuristic nature of case-based inference and aspects of uncertainty in CBR.

The British National Bibliography - Arthur James Wells 2000

Voting Paradoxes and How to Deal with Them - Hannu Nurmi 2013-04-17

Voting paradoxes are unpleasant surprises encountered in voting. Typically they suggest that something is wrong with the way in which individual opinions are being expressed or processed in voting. The outcomes are bizarre, unfair or otherwise implausible, given the expressed opinions of voters. Voting paradoxes have an important role in the history of social choice theory. The founding fathers of the theory, Marquis de Condorcet and Jean-Charles de Borda, were keenly aware of some of them. Indeed, much of the work of these and other forerunners of the modern social choice theory dealt with ways of avoiding paradoxes related to voting. One of the early paradoxes, viz. that bearing the name of Condorcet, has subsequently gained such a prominent place in the literature that it is sometimes called the paradox of voting. One of the aims of the present work is to show that Condorcet's is but one of many paradoxes of voting. Some of these are pretty closely interrelated making it meaningful to classify them. This is the second main aim of this book. The third objective is to suggest ways of dealing with paradoxes. Since voting is and has always been an essential instrument of democratic rule, it is of some interest to find out how voting paradoxes are being dealt with by past and present methods of voting. Of even greater interest is to find ways of minimizing the probability of occurrence of various paradoxes. By their very nature some paradoxes are unavoidable.

Modelling, Computation and Optimization in Information Systems and Management Sciences - Hoai An Le Thi 2015-05-07

This proceedings set contains 85 selected full papers presented at the 3rd International Conference on Modelling, Computation and Optimization in Information Systems and Management Sciences - MCO 2015, held on May 11-13, 2015 at Lorraine University, France. The present part II of the 2 volume set includes articles devoted to Data analysis and Data mining, Heuristic / Meta heuristic methods for operational research applications, Optimization applied to surveillance and threat detection, Maintenance and Scheduling, Post Crises banking and eco-finance modelling, Transportation, as well as Technologies and methods for multi-stakeholder decision analysis in public settings.

Rule by Multiple Majorities - Sean Ingham 2019-02-07

Ingham explores how multiple, overlapping majorities can have control in a democracy, even if there is not a unified 'will of the people'. This book will be of interest to political theorists as well as political scientists who study electoral accountability, representation, and social choice theory.

Operations Research Proceedings 2014 - Marco Lübbecke 2016-02-20

This book contains a selection of refereed papers presented at the "International Conference on Operations Research (OR 2014)", which took place at RWTH Aachen University, Germany, September 2-5, 2014. More than 800 scientists and students from 47 countries attended OR 2014 and presented more than 500 papers in parallel topical streams, as well as special award sessions. The theme of the conference and its

proceedings is "Business Analytics and Optimization".

Bibliographic Guide to Psychology - New York Public Library.
Research Libraries 2000

Journal of Economic Literature - 1999

Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems - Nils Bulling 2014-07-21

This book constitutes the proceedings of the 15th International Workshop on Computational Logic in Multi-Agent Systems, CLIMA XV, held in Prague, Czech Republic, in August 2014. The 12 regular papers were carefully reviewed and selected from 20 submissions. The purpose of the CLIMA workshops is to provide a forum for discussing techniques, based on computational logic, for representing, programming and reasoning about agents and multi-agent systems in a formal way. This edition will feature two special sessions: logics for agreement technologies and logics for games, strategic reasoning, and social choice.

Utility Maximization, Choice and Preference - Fuad Aleskerov 2007-08-09

The utility maximization paradigm forms the basis of many economic, psychological, cognitive and behavioral models. However, numerous examples have revealed the deficiencies of the concept. This book helps to overcome those deficiencies by taking into account insensitivity of measurement threshold and context of choice. The second edition has been updated to include the most recent developments and a new chapter on classic and new results for infinite sets.

The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy - Matthew D. Adler 2016-04-21

What are the methodologies for assessing and improving governmental policy in light of well-being? The Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy provides a comprehensive, interdisciplinary treatment of this topic. The contributors draw from welfare economics, moral philosophy, and psychology and are leading scholars in these fields. The Handbook includes thirty chapters divided into four Parts. Part I covers the full range of methodologies for evaluating governmental policy and assessing societal condition—including both the leading approaches in current use by policymakers and academics (such as GDP, cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, inequality and poverty metrics, and the concept of the "social welfare function"), and emerging techniques. Part II focuses on the nature of well-being. What, most fundamentally, determines whether an individual life is better or worse for the person living it? Her happiness? Her preference-satisfaction? Her attainment of various "objective goods"? Part III addresses the measurement of well-being and the thorny topic of interpersonal comparisons. How can we construct a meaningful scale of individual welfare, which allows for comparisons of well-being levels and differences, both within one individual's life, and across lives? Finally, Part IV reviews the major challenges to designing governmental policy around individual well-being.

Brinkman's catalogus van boeken en tijdschriften - 2001

With 1901/1910-1956/1960 Repertorium is bound: Brinkman's Titel-catalogus van de gedurende 1901/1910-1956/1960 (Title varies slightly).

Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory - Wulf Gaertner
2001-09-06

Wulf Gaertner provides a comprehensive account of an important and complex issue within social choice theory: how to establish a social welfare function while restricting the spectrum of individual preferences in a sensible way. Gaertner's starting point is K. J. Arrow's famous 'Impossibility Theorem', which showed that no welfare function could exist if an unrestricted domain of preferences is to be satisfied together with some other appealing conditions. A number of leading economists have tried to provide avenues out of this 'impossibility' by restricting the variety of preferences: here, Gaertner provides a clear and detailed account, using standardized mathematical notation, of well over forty theorems associated with domain conditions. Domain Conditions in Social Choice Theory will be an essential addition to the library of social choice theory for scholars and their advanced graduate students.

Scalable Uncertainty Management - Florence Dupin de Saint-Cyr 2022

This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 15th International Conference on Scalable Uncertainty Management, SUM 2022, which was held in Paris, France, in October 2022. The 19 full and 4 short papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from 25 submissions. Besides that, the book also contains 3 abstracts of invited talks and 2 tutorial papers. The conference aims to gather researchers with a common interest in managing and analyzing imperfect information from a wide range of fields, such as artificial intelligence and machine learning, databases, information retrieval and data mining, the semantic

web and risk analysis. The chapter "Defining and Enforcing Descriptive Accuracy in Explanations: the Case of Probabilistic Classifiers" is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

Limit Theorems and Applications of Set-Valued and Fuzzy Set-Valued Random Variables - Shoumei Li 2013-04-17

After the pioneering works by Robbins {1944, 1945} and Choquet (1955), the notation of a set-valued random variable (called a random closed set in literatures) was systematically introduced by Kendall {1974} and Matheron {1975}. It is well known that the theory of set-valued random variables is a natural extension of that of general real-valued random variables or random vectors. However, owing to the topological structure of the space of closed sets and special features of set-theoretic operations (cf. Beer [27]), set-valued random variables have many special properties. This gives new meanings for the classical probability theory. As a result of the development in this area in the past more than 30 years, the theory of set-valued random variables with many applications has become one of new and active branches in probability theory. In practice also, we are often faced with random experiments whose outcomes are not numbers but are expressed in inexact linguistic terms.

Suna Kili'ye armağan - Suna Kili 1998

Politics and government; Turkey; economic and social aspects.

A Measured Approach to Ending Poverty and Boosting Shared Prosperity - Dean Jolliffe 2014-10-07

"This Policy Research Report was prepared by the Development Economics Research Group of the World Bank by a team led by Dean Jolliffe and Peter Lanjouw"--Page xiii.

Trends in Computational Social Choice - Ulle Endriss 2017-10-26

Computational social choice is concerned with the design and analysis of methods for collective decision making. It is a research area that is located at the interface of computer science and economics. The central question studied in computational social choice is that of how best to aggregate the individual points of view of several agents, so as to arrive at a reasonable compromise. Examples include tallying the votes cast in an election, aggregating the professional opinions of several experts, and finding a fair manner of dividing a set of resources amongst the members of a group -- Back cover.

Monotonicity Failures Afflicting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate - Dan S. Felsenthal 2017-02-08

This book provides an evaluation of 18 voting procedures in terms of the most important monotonicity-related criteria in fixed and variable electorates. All voting procedures studied aim at electing one out of several candidates given the voters' preferences over the candidates. In addition to (strict) monotonicity failures, the vulnerability of the procedures to variation of the no-show paradoxes is discussed. All vulnerabilities are exemplified and explained. The occurrence of the no-show paradoxes is related to the presence or absence of a Condorcet winner. The primary readership of this book are scholars and students in the area of social choice.

Welfare Economics and Social Choice Theory - Allan M. Feldman
2006-06-14

This book covers the main topics of welfare economics — general equilibrium models of exchange and production, Pareto optimality, uncertainty, externalities and public goods — and some of the major topics of social choice theory — compensation criteria, fairness, voting. Arrow's Theorem, and the theory of implementation. The underlying question is this: "Is a particular economic or voting mechanism good or bad for society?" Welfare economics is mainly about whether the market mechanism is good or bad; social choice is largely about whether voting mechanisms, or other more abstract mechanisms, can improve upon the results of the market. This second edition updates the material of the first, written by Allan Feldman. It incorporates new sections to existing first-edition chapters, and it includes several new ones. Chapters 4, 6, 11, 15 and 16 are new, added in this edition. The first edition of the book grew out of an undergraduate welfare economics course at Brown University. The book is intended for the undergraduate student who has some prior familiarity with microeconomics. However, the book is also useful for graduate students and professionals, economists and non-economists, who want an overview of welfare and social choice results unburdened by detail and mathematical complexity. Welfare economics and social choice both probably suffer from excessively technical treatments in professional journals and monographs.

Axiomatic Consensus Theory in Group Choice and Biomathematics - William H. E. Day 2003-01-01

A unique comprehensive review of axiomatic consensus theory in biomathematics as it has developed over the past 30 years.

Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare - Kenneth J. Arrow 2002

The Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare presents, in two volumes, essays on past and on-going work in social choice theory and welfare economics. The first volume consists of four parts. In Part 1 (Arrowian Impossibility Theorems), various aspects of Arrowian general impossibility theorems, illustrated by the simple majority cycle first identified by Condorcet, are expounded and evaluated. It also provides a critical survey of the work on different escape routes from impossibility results of this kind. In Part 2 (Voting Schemes and Mechanisms), the operation and performance of voting schemes and cost-sharing mechanisms are examined axiomatically, and some aspects of the modern theory of incentives and mechanism design are expounded and surveyed. In Part 3 (structure of social choice rules), the positional rules of collective decision-making (the origin of which can be traced back to a seminal proposal by Borda), the game-theoretic aspects of voting in committees, and the implications of making use of interpersonal comparisons of welfare (with or without cardinal measurability) are expounded, and the status of utilitarianism as a theory of justice is critically examined. It also provides an analytical survey of the foundations of measurement of inequality and poverty. In order to place these broad issues (as well as further issues to be discussed in the second volume of the Handbook) in perspective, Kotaro Suzumura has

written an extensive introduction, discussing the historical background of social choice theory, the vistas opened by Arrow's Social Choice and Individual Values, the famous "socialist planning" controversy, and the theoretical and practical significance of social choice theory. The primary purpose of this Handbook is to provide an accessible introduction to the current state of the art in social choice theory and welfare economics.

The expounded theory has a strong and constructive message for pursuing human well-being and facilitating collective decision-making.

*Advances economists' understanding of recent advances in social choice and welfare *Distills and applies research to a wide range of social issues

*Provides analytical material for evaluating new scholarship *Offers consolidated reviews and analyses of scholarship in a framework that encourages synthesis--

Transactions on Computational Collective Intelligence XXXVI -

Ngoc Thanh Nguyen 2021-12-04

These transactions publish research in computer-based methods of computational collective intelligence (CCI) and their applications in a wide range of fields such as performance optimization in IoT, big data, reliability, privacy, security, service selection, QoS and machine learning. This 36th issue contains 7 selected papers which present new findings and innovative methodologies as well as discuss issues and challenges in the field of collective intelligence from big data and networking paradigms while addressing security, privacy, reliability and optimality to achieve QoS to the benefit of final users

Mathematical Reviews - 2006